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INTRODUCTION
Since the evolution of the common law, the execution of the in-
sane has consistently been seen as "savage and inhumane."' Black-
stone, Coke, and Hawles, among others, have condemned the prac-
tice.2 In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court "ke [pt] faith with our
common law heritage" and explicitly held that it is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to execute the insane.5
Neither the common law nor Ford, however, contemplated the
evolving science of antipsychotic medications. As the effectiveness of
6these drugs dramatically improves, more and more inmates who
would formerly have been incompetent either to stand trial or face
execution are able to use medication to restore their competency.
Most of the time, these inmates take the drugs voluntarily; they prefer
to live without the symptoms of their illnesses. As execution ap-
proaches, though, condemned prisoners have every incentive to stop
taking the drugs and revert to insanity. Under Ford, they would then
be guaranteed a stay of execution. But in the last year, in Singleton v.
Norris,7 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sanctioned a prac-
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Professors Seth
Kreimer, Bruce Mann, and Stephen Morse for their invaluable comments, suggestions, and in-
spiration; to Frances Fu, Steven Healey, and Matthew Seidner for their superb editing; and to
Emily Saslow, Bryan Tallevi, Akua Asare, Lexer Quamie, Erica Flores, Dionne Anthon, and the
entire editorial staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for all their hard work. Any remaining
errors of fact or law are solely my own.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25.
See infra Part I.B.
477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (holding that the Constitution forbids the execution of the in-
sane).
, The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] in-
flicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
6 See Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664, at 14 ("[t]he benefits of antipsychotic
medications ... are so palpably great.").
7 319 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003).
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ice previously proscribed in Louisiana and South Carolina-the in-
voluntary administration of antipsychotic medication to restore a
capital inmate's competency for execution.
It makes little sense to grant what is in effect a permanent stay of
execution to inmates who not only can be, but, absent their death
sentence, would prefer to be medically competent through antipsy-
chotic medications. Further, there is simply no reason to proscribe
this involuntary medication procedure. The rationales of Ford do not
apply to inmates who are medically competent: the execution of
these prisoners furthers the deterrent and retributive goals of capital
punishment, it comports with the current law, and there are no viable
alternatives if the state wishes to carry out the death sentence. The
conclusion is inescapable that a state should be permitted to involun-
tarily medicate a mentally ill inmate for the purpose of execution. If
the state wishes to engage in capital punishment, there is no persua-
sive reason to differentiate between inmates of medically-induced
competence and other capital inmates.
For the purposes of this Comment, a few assumptions must be
made. It must be assumed that the inmate was sane at the time of the
crime and unable to make out a case of acquittal by reason of insan-
ity. It must also be assumed that the inmate was competent to be sen-
tenced, removing any improper foundation from the imposition of
the death penalty. The inmate must lose his competency between
sentencing and execution. Finally, it must be assumed that the in-
mate, when medicated, is in fact Ford-competent to be executed." Any
defendant to whom these assumptions are inapplicable is outside the
purview of this analysis.
This Comment will examine both the current case law on the trial
and execution of the mentally ill and the applicability of that law to
mentally ill inmates who can be restored to competency. Part I pro-
vides a history of the mentally ill on death row and a discussion of
Ford v. Wainwright. Part II examines the case law of forcible medica-
tion of inmates and defendants in Washington v. Harper, Riggins v. Ne-
vada, and Sell v. United States. Part III discusses the forced medication
of death row inmates in terms of both state and federal (Singleton v.
Norris) law. Part IV concludes both that the case law does not pre-
clude the forcible medication of inmates to restore their competency
for execution and that there are no other viable options for courts
wishing to avoid forcible medication.
' The dissenting judge in Singleton describes Singleton as "arguably incompetent when
treated." It must be assumed that, when medicated, Singleton is competent to face execution.
See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1030.
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I. THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE DEATH PENALTY: FORD
A. The Onset of Insanity on Death Row
Fifty years ago, Justice Frankfurter wrote that " [i] n the history of
murder, the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sen-
tence is not a rare phenomenon."9 As the death row populations
have increased sixfold over the last twenty-five years," mental deterio-
ration among death row inmates has become even more common.
Prisoners on death row are subject to what has been described as
"one of the least common and possibly the most stressful of all hu-
man experiences-the anticipation of death at a specific moment
and time and in a known manner.7 " In addition to this stress, death
row inmates often experience "social isolation and a lack of exercise,
education, and work programs; family visits are infrequent and bur-
dened with security restrictions.'
2
An additional stress on the mental state of death row inmates is
the growing tenure of the average inmate. In the past twenty-five
years, the death row population has increased. 3 The appeals process
has multiplied in complexity and length, and courts have experi-
enced significant backlogs of appeals, particularly petitions for the
writ of habeas corpus. 4 As a typical death row inmate "exercises every
available appellate right," 5 inmate tenure on death row can reach
lengths of ten years or more.16
9 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter,J., dissenting).
'0 In 1979, there were 593 people on death row and two executions; in 2002, there were
3,557 people on death row and seventy-one executions. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2002 (2003).
" Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent": Cruel and Unusual?,
66 TUL. L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1992) (quotingJohnnie L. Gallemore &James H. Panton, Inmate
Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1972)); see also Keith
Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REv. 361, 367
(1994) (discussing the "stress placed" on death row inmates).
12 Byerg, supra note 11, at 368 (quoting Harvey Bluestone & Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to
Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1962)).
'3 See supra note 10.
" In the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York, for example, the habeas
backlog was so overwhelming that SeniorJudge Jack B. Weinstein devoted, for the entire year of
2003, his docket almost exclusively to adjudicating the more than 500 pending habeas petitions.
See In re Habeas Cases, 298 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting of 500 habeas petitions for
federal review).
'5 Byers, supra note 11, at 369.
. Id.; see also Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35, 42 (1986).
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A 1984 study 7 done in Florida estimated that "as many as fifty per-
cent of Florida's death row inmates become intermittently insane.
Describing the inmates, the author wrote:
They go in and out. Like most people with mental illness, they have crisis
periods, and other periods when they can function. A lot depends on
stress, bad diet, lack of medication, lack of exercise .... Some of these
people are much too crazy to help their attorneys prepare appeals. They
might have been able to assist their attorneys at trial time, three years,
five years, earlier, but now they are totally psychotic, irrational. It doesn't
take an expert to tell that.... Five to ten percent of the inmates go so far
over the edge that we can never bring them back. We watch this happen
to them. We saw it happen to [Alvin Bernard] Ford. 9
There is no reason to believe either that the mental condition of
inmates elsewhere is any better than in Florida or that the situation in
Florida (or elsewhere) has improved since 1984. As a result, "it
should not be surprising that condemned prisoners could and do be-
come incompetent before their death sentences are carried out.
20
Whether the cause is latent mental illness, terrible prison conditions,
an agonizingly long tenure on death row, or a combination of these,
a significant number of death row inmates have begun "asserting that
their prolonged confinement under sentence of death has left them
mentally incompetent,"2' forcing the courts to deal with such claims
more frequently.
B. Ford v. Wainwright
In 1974, Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. At the time of his crime, trial, and sentencing,
Ford was competent and made no argument to the contrary. During
the course of his appeals, however, he began to manifest strange be-
haviors. He became obsessed with the Ku Klux Klan and began to be-
lieve "that he had become the target of a complex conspiracy, involv-
ing the Klan and assorted others. 2 2 He also claimed that his female
relatives were being tortured and "sexually abused" within the
prison. 23 This delusion worsened, and Ford eventually reported that
not only were "135 of his friends and family.., being held hostage in
17 Robert Sherrill, In Florida, Insanity Is No Defense, NATION, 551, 555-56 (Nov. 24, 1984),
quoted in Ward, supra note 16, at 43 n.42.
" Ward, supra note 16, at 42.
'9 Id. at 42-43 (quoting Sherrill, supra note 17, at 555-56).
20 Byers, supra note 11, at 371.
2 Ward, supra note 11, at 37.
22 Ford, 477 U.S. 399, 402 (1986)
2' _.
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the prison," but also that Senator Ted Kennedy was among the hos-
tages.24
At this time, Ford was evaluated by a psychiatrist. In 1983, after
more than a year of evaluations, the psychiatrist concluded that "Ford
suffered from 'a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which closely
resembles Paranoid Schizophrenia With Suicide Potential'-a 'major
mental disorder.., severe enough to substantially affect Mr. Ford's
present ability to assist in the defense of his life."'25
In an interview with a second psychiatri t, 26 Ford stated that "I'm
free to go whenever I want because [my execution] would be illegal
and the executioner would be executed. 2 ' He made this statement
"amidst long streams of seemingly unrelated thoughts in rapid suc-
cession. ' '28 The second psychiatrist concluded that Ford did not un-
derstand why he was to be executed, made no connection between
his crime and the penalty, and "sincerely believed that he would not
be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the
Governor through mind waves., 2 9 As time progressed, Ford's mental
health regressed even further.
After a competency hearing, at which three different state doctors
found that Ford could comprehend "the death penalty and why it was
imposed upon him,"30 Governor Bob Graham signed a warrant for
Ford's execution. Ford's petitions for writ of habeas corpus were de-
nied in turn by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals of the
Eleventh Circuit." The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
2
The Court, by Justice Marshall, found that Ford was insane and
held, in accordance with the common law, that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death
upon a prisoner who is insane., 3  The Court failed to articulate a
specific reason for this holding and instead, quoting Holmes, found
2 Id.
2' Id. at 402-03 (quoting Dr. Jamal Amin, Brief for Appellant at 53, Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5542)), 1985 U.S. Briefs 5542.
Ford refused to see the first psychiatrist again, "believing him to have joined the conspir-
acy against him." Id. at 403.
27 Id.
Id.
29 Id.
Id. at 403-04.
Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming the Southern District of
Florida's denial of a writ of habeas corpus).
:2 Ford v. Wainwright, 474 U.S. 1019 (1985).
' Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (overruling
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) and holding that "the Constitution 'places a substantive
restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender.") (quoting
Ford, 477 U.S. at 405).
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that "reasons for the rule are less sure and less uniform than the rule
itself. 3 4 Some of the many reasons mentioned by the Court include
that the execution of the insane "simply offends humanity";3 5 it lacks
"deterrence value";36 and it lacks sufficient retributive value, as the
execution of an insane person "has a 'lesser value' than that of the
crime for which he is to be punished.
3 7
In his concurrence, Justice Powell announced what has become
the controlling standard of competency for execution: "the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of
the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer
it. 38 This standard requires both that the inmate "perceive[] the
connection between his crime and his punishment" and that he be
"aware that his death is approaching., 39 This standard comports with
the common law standard of awareness of a conviction and impend-
ing execution. 4°
II. THE FORCED MEDICATION OF INMATES AND DEFENDANTS:
HARPER, RIGGINS, AND SELL
A. Washington v. Harper
In 1976, Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery.4' For
most of the next four years, he was incarcerated in the mental health
unit of the Washington State Penitentiary, "where he consented to
the administration of antipsychotic drugs., 42 After parole and re-
incarceration, Harper received treatment at the Special Offender
Center ("SOC") for the treatment of "convicted felons with serious
mental disorders., 43 In November 1982, Harper "refused to continue
taking the prescribed medications," whereupon his doctors sought to
forcibly medicate him over his objections.44
Pursuant to SOC policy, Harper was given a hearing "before a
special committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881)).
Id. (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES 6 (6th Ed. 1680)).
'6 Id.
37 Id. at 408 (quoting Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9
UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962)).
Id. at 422 (Powell,J., concurring).
39 Id.
0 Mark A. Small & Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be Executed, 18 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 146, 147, 148 (1991) ("[T]he common law test requires that the condemned be aware of
the fact that he was convicted and is about to be executed.").
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990).
4 Id.
41 Id. at 214.
44 Id.
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Associate Superintendent of the [SOC]",;45 the committee "found that
[Harper] was a danger to others as a result of a mental disease or dis-
order, and approved the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs.64
Harper filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 4 alleging violations of
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech. After being denied
relief in a bench trial, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, 48
finding that forcible medication is permissible only if it is proven by
"clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" that the administration of
antipsychotic medication is both necessary and effective for further-
ing a compelling state interest. 49 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.
The Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that Harper "possess[ed] a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."5' The Court held that the standard by which the con-
stitutionality of involuntary medication was judged was "reasonabl [e]
relation to legitimate penological interests, " 5T as opposed to the
Washington Supreme Court's standard of "'clear, cogent, and con-
vincing' evidence. In particular, three factors were relevant "to de-
termine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation":
54
First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regu-
lation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.
Second, a court must consider the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the al-
location of prison resources generally. Third, the absence of ready alter-
natives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation, but this
does not mean that prison officials have to set up and then shoot down
every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's
55constitutional complaint.
Applying these factors, the Court noted the duty of the State to en-
sure the safety of both prisoners and prison staffb and the lack of ac-
I d. at 215.
SId. at 217.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws."
18 Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358 (Wash. 1988)
49 Id. at 364-65 (internal quotations omitted).
Washington v. Harper, 489 U.S. 210 (1989).
Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 223 (quotations and citations omitted).
5' Harper, 759 P.2d at 364-65.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 224.
Id. at 224-25 (quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 225.
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ceptable alternatives.f Thus the Court held that, within the prison
environment, "the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a
prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic
drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others
and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.",5 The Court
also held that the inmate's rights were "adequately protected, per-
haps better served," when the decision is made by medical profes-
sionals, as opposed to ajudge.5 9
B. Riggins v. Nevada
In November 1987, David Riggins was arrested and charged with
murder and robbery.6° After complaining of "hearing voices in his
head," Riggins began treatment with antipsychotic drugs.6' After be-
ing found competent to stand trial, Riggins moved to suspend the
administration of the drugs, claiming that the drugs would have an
effect on his mental state at trial, particularly since he planned to
mount an insanity defense.62 The trial court denied the motion andcontinud .. ... 63..
continued the administration of the drugs involuntarily. Riggins wasconvited .64
convicted of robbery and capital murder. The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, holding that expert testimony on the
effects of the drugs "was sufficient to inform the jur7 of the effect of
[the drugs] on Riggins' demeanor and testimony." The Supreme
66Court granted certiorari.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, reaffirmed
Harper and emphasized that involuntary medication "'represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty.' 67 The Court then
held that "[u] nder Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted
prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification
and a determination of medical appropriateness."6 The Court found
that Nevada failed to make a Harper-showing that "treatment with an-
tipsychotic medication was medically appropriate . . . [and] essential
for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others."69 While
5' Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 231.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992).
61 Id.
61 Id. at 130.
6' Id. at 131.
6 Id.
Riggins v. Nevada, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (Nev. 1991).
Riggins v. Nevada, 502 U.S. 807 (1991).
67 Riggns, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
s Id. at 135.
69 Id.
(Vol. 7:1
NO REASON FOR EXEMPTION
implying that forcible medication of a defendant for the purpose of
restoring competency for trial would be permissible if the proper
showing was made, the Court reversed the Nevada Supreme Court's
decision for failing to require such a showing."'
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, expressed concern
with the side effects of antipsychotic drugs on defendants at trial. He
mentioned that these drugs may prejudice a defendant in two ways:
"(1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his re-
actions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him
unable or unwilling to assist counsel."71 According to Kennedy, "[i]f
the defendant cannot be tried without his behavior and demeanor
being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treatment," the
state must civilly commit him in lieu of trial. As long as these drugs
continue to have significant side effects, Kennedy would "permit their
use only when the State can show that involuntary treatment does not
cause alterations raising [constitutional] concerns.,
72
C. Sell v. United States
Charles Sell, formerly a practicing dentist with a long history of
mental illness, was charged in 1997 with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud,
money laundering, and, in a separate indictment, the attempted
murder of the FBI agent who arrested him.73 After a bail revocation
hearing, at which Sell's behavior "was in the judge's words, 'totally
out of control,' 74 Sell was found mentally incompetent to stand trial
and ordered to be hospitalized "to determine whether there was a
substantial probability that he would attain the capacity to allow his
trial to proceed. 7 5  Two months later, hospital staff recommended
that Sell take antipsychotic medication; when Sell refused to do so,
"the staff sought permission to administer the medication against
Sell's will. ' 76  A reviewing psychiatrist authorized the involuntary
medication,77 and that order was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.78
M Id. at 138.
71 Id. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Brief for American Psychiatric Association as
Amicus Curiae, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1990) (No. 90-8466), 1990 U.S. Briefs 8466 at 9
(outlining the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs, including nervousness and restless-
ness or sedation "as to appear bored, cold, unfeeling, and unresponsive"); Rebecca A. Miller-
Rice, Comment: The "Insane" Contradiction of Singleton v. Norris: Forced Medication in a Death Row
Inmate's Medical Interest Which Happens to Facilitate His Execution, 22 U. ARK. LITIPLE ROCK L. REv.
659, 668 n.41 (discussing the effects the drug Mellaril had upon Riggins).
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7' Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
7, Id. at 173 (quoting the Court's appellate record).
75 Id. (quoting the Court's appellate record).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 171.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari"9 on the question of whether it
is violative of the Constitution to permit "the government to adminis-
ter antipsychotic medication against [Sell's] will solely to render him
competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses."80
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that "the Consti-
tution allows the Government to administer [antipsychotic] drugs,
even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances.,' The
Court found that Harper and Riggins, taken together, stand for the
proposition:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal
charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but
only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to
have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking
account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests.
Thus, it is permissible for a state to involuntarily administer drugs
solely for trial-related purposes.3 Moreover, the Court held in the
above proposition a.requirement of four findings that a court must
make before ordering a defendant to be involuntarily medicated to
restore his trial competency.84
First, a court must find that "important governmental interests are
at stake. 8" The Court reaffirmed that the state has an important and
substantial interest in both "bringing to trial an individual accused of
a serious crime" and "timely prosecution. 86  Second, a court must
conclude that "involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests. 8 ' A court must find that the drug is
"substantially likely to render the defendant competent" while also
being "substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere
significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conduct-
ing a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.8 .. Third, the
78 United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
"' Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999 (2002).
Sell, 539 U.S. at 173 (quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 167.
" Id. at 181.
' Id.
84Id.
85 Id. (emphasis in original).
' Id. The Court also noted that "[s]pecial circumstances may lessen the importance of
[these] interest[s]." Id. Specifically, the Court suggested that "the potential for future con-
finement" or "lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill" might affect, but not
obviate, the Government's need for prosecution (as defendants ordinarily receive credit for
time already served (18 U.S.C § 3585(b))). Id.
Id. (emphasis in original)
Id. (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504. U.S. 127, 142-45 (1992)) (KennedyJ., concurring). It
seems that this second required finding, namely that the drug(s) will not have significant side
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court must find that "involuntary medication is necessary to further
those interests"; i.e., "any alternative, less intrusive treatments [must
be] unlikely to achieve substantially the same results."8 9 Finally, "the
court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically ap-
propriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical
condition."90 If the drugs would not ordinarily be medically appropri-
ate to a person with the defendant's condition, the fact that the state
has an interest in trying the defendant does not make a given course
of treatment more appropriate. 9
Because the Court of Appeals did not make the inquiries required
by the opinion, the Court vacated and remanded the case for re-
evaluation based on Dr. Sell's current medical condition.
92
III. THE FORCED MEDICATION OF DEATH Row INMATES: PERRY,
SINGLETON V. SOUTH CAROLINA, AND SINGLETON V. NORPS
A. Louisiana v. Perry
In a case of first impression for state supreme courts, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court found that forcibly medicating an otherwise in-
sane inmate to "circumvent" Ford v. Wainwright was violative of the
Louisiana State Constitution.
effects that would render the trial unfair, was tailored to allay the fears expressed by Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence in Riggins. See also, Brief for the American Psychiatric Association
and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664 at 27-30 (advocating
the use of antipsychotic drugs and discussing the possible fair trial side effects on forcibly-
medicated defendants).
Id.
Id. (second emphasis added).
The Court also noted that the inquiry mandated by Sell is not needed "if forced medica-
tion is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper related to the
individual's dangerousness." Id. at 2185-86 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-
26 (1990)) ("If a court authorizes medication on these alternative grounds, the need to con-
sider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear."). The Court felt that, as
a general matter, courts should attempt to justify forced drug administration under these
grounds before inquiring into plausible Sell grounds, if possible, for two primary reasons:
(1) "the inquiry into whether medication is permissible, say, to render an individual non-
dangerous is usually more 'objective and manageable' than the inquiry into whether medica-
tion is permissible to render a defendant competent" (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140); and
(2) "courts typically address involuntary medical treatment as a civil matter, and justify it on
these alternative, Harper-type grounds" (citing examples of state civil guardianship statutes).
92 Compare Sell with United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 883-85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (focusing,
in a case with facts similar to Sell, on the effects the drugs would have on the defendant's trial
rights, namely his behavior on the witness stand, his right to testify in his own words, and his
possibly altered demeanor).
State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747, 750 (La. 1992).
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Michael Owen Perry was diagnosed as a schizophrenic at age six-
teen and was committed to mental institutions several times during
his life.94 In 1983, at age twenty-eight, Perry brutally murdered five of
his close family members. After an eighteen-month period in which
he was treated with antipsychotic drugs, Perry was found to be com-
petent to stand trial.95 A jury convicted him and sentenced him to
death, whereupon a committee was convened to evaluate Perry's san-
ity to be executed.96 The medical experts found that Perry "suffers
from an incurable schizoaffective disorder"; 7 while these symptoms
"can be temporarily diminished with antipsychotic drugs," . . . "his
underlying insanity can never be permanendy cured."9 The lower
court found, in essence, that "without the influence of antipsychotic
drugs, Perry is insane and incompetent for execution."99 Thus, the
lower court ordered the involuntary medication of Perry. After the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' °° and subsequently
remanded the case in liht of Harper,'°' the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana granted certiorari.'
The Court initially reaffirmed the rule, under Ford and Louisiana
common law, that "executing the insane is barred in [Louisiana]."'10
3
The Court then distinguished Harper, finding that, while a Harper-
medication regime would promote healing in accordance with the
Hippocratic Oath, an involuntary medication regime for the purpose
of restoring competency for execution "is antithetical to the basic
principles of the healing arts."1 4 The Court also found that Harper
focused on the inmate's "medical interest," which is clearly not served
by so-called "drugging for execution. '0°  The Court also held that
forcibly medicating an inmate solely for the purpose of restoring
competency to be executed was cruel, excessive, and unusual:
The punishment is cruel because it imposes significantly more indignity,
pain and suffering than ordinarily is necessary for the mere extinguish-
Id. at 748.
Id. (citations omitted).
SId.
Id. The effects of this disorder were such that "his days [were] a series of hallucinations,
delusional and disordered thinking, incoherent speech, and manic behavior." Id.
8 Id. See generally Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity,"
"Artificial Competence, "and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983) (offering an in-depth discussion into the effects of drugs on men-
tally ill patients and the debate over whether they merely create "synthetic sanity").
% Id.
"0 Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 1015 (1990).
'o' Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990).
102 State v. Perry, 584 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1991).
'0' Pery, 610 So. 2d at 750.
'9" Id. (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)).
,05 Id. at 753, 755. See also Miller-Rice, supra note 71 (discussing the medical ethical implica-
tions of "drugging for execution").
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ment of life, excessive because it imposes a severe penalty without fur-
thering any of the valid social goals of punishment, and unusual because
it subjects to the death penalty a class of offenders that has been exempt
therefrom for centuries and adds novel burdens to the punishment of
the insane which will not be suffered by sane capital offenders.' °6
Finally, the Court found that such an execution would not "measura-
bly further either goal of [capital punishment]: deterrence or retri-
bution.10 7  As such, the medication regime ordered by the lower
court "would offend civilized standards of decency" and is violative of
the Louisiana State Constitution. 08 The Court reversed the medica-
tion regime and ordered a stay of execution until "Perry achieves or
regains his sanity independently of and without the influence of an-
tipsychotic drugs."'0 9
B. Singleton v. South Carolina
Fred Singleton was convicted of "murder, burglary, larceny of a
motor vehicle, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct" and was sen-
tenced to death."0 In a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), Sin-
gleton alleged that he was not competent to be executed."' The PCR
judge held Singleton "incompetent to be executed under either the
A.B.A. Standard or the standard set forth in Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Ford v. Wainwright."' 1 2 The government appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted "a slightly modified"
A.B.A. standard to satisfy federal due process, common law, and the
South Carolina Constitution:
[T]he appropriate test in South Carolina [is] a two-prong analysis. The
first prong is the cognitive prong which can be defined as: whether a
convicted defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what
'w Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761.
.07 Id. at 765.
..8 Id. at 768.
"o' Id. at 747.
"0 Singleton v. South Carolina, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
.. Id. at 55.
. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)). The ABA Standard is as follows:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retarda-
tion, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pendng proceedings, what he or
she was tried for, the reason for the punishment or the nature of the punishment. A
convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or retardation, the convict
lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might exist which
would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such in-
formation to counsel or the court.
A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-5.6. (1989), available at http://
www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/mentalhealth_blk.html#7-5.6 (last visited Sept.14, 2004).
Justice Powell's standard in Ford is: "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of
those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell,J., concurring).
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he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the nature of
the punishment. The second prong is the assistance prong which can be
defined as: whether the convicted defendant possesses sufficient capacity
or ability to rationally communicate with counsel.1
3
Under this standard, the court held that Singleton was "incapable of
meeting even a modicum of competency. ,114
As to the question of whether the State could forcibly medicate
Singleton to restore his competency, the court relied on Louisiana v.
Perry,1 5 as the Louisiana Constitution is "strikingly similar" to the
South Carolina Constitution."6 Like the Louisiana court, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that "the South Carolina Constitu-
tional right of privacy would be violated if the State were to sanction
forced medication solely to facilitate execution. '"7 Further, referring
to the American Medical Association ("AMA") and the American Psy-
chiatric Association ("APA"), the court found that "the medical ethi-
cal position reinforces the mandates of our constitutional law.""" In
closing, the court unequivocally found that 'justice can never be
served by forcing medication on an incompetent inmate for the sole
purpose of getting him well enough to execute.'"" 9 The court there-
fore reversed the involuntary medication order and granted a per-
manent stay of execution.
C. Singleton v. Norris
In 1979, in an apparent attempted robbery, Charles Laverne Sin-
gleton stabbed his victim twice in the neck.1 20 As the victim was taken
to the hospital, she identified Singleton as her killer several times be-
fore she died.12" ' He was convicted of capital felony murder and sen-
tenced to death. 2 2 Singleton never alleged that he was insane or in-
.. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
"' Id. The court cited evidence from the record to this effect, including "Singleton is com-
pletely unaware that he is capable of dying in the electric chair" and "Singleton is incapable of
rational communication." Id. The court doubted that Singleton could meet either prong, let
alone both. Id.
"5 Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
16 Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61.
117 Id.
"s Id.
"9 Id. at 62.
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003);
see also Neil A. Lewis, Justices Let Stand Ruling That Allows Forcibly Drugging an Inmate Before Execu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, atA16. It should be noted that Singleton was decided between the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), and the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), which vacated and remanded the
case back to the Eighth Circuit.
.. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1021 (citations omitted).
'n Id. at 1020.
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competent at the time of the crime, trial, or sentencing. In 1992, af-
ter ten years of appeals, Singleton alleged, for the first time, that he
was incompetent to be executed.123 "He requested that his treatment
with antipsychotic drugs be terminated and that a competency ex-
amination be held after the effect of the drugs had subsided.' 4 In
1997, after all of his petitions were dismissed, "the State placed Sin-
gleton on an involuntary medication regime after a medication re-
view panel unanimously agreed that he posed a danger to himself
and others. 125 The medication took effect and the psychotic symp-
toms abated. Arkansas proceeded to set an execution date for Single-
ton, whereupon he filed another petition for habeas corpus, "arguing
that the State could not constitutionally restore his Ford competency
through use of forced medication and then execute him.'2 6 In deny-
ing the petition, the district court found that "Singleton was not Ford-
competent at the time the involuntary medication regime began in
1997.' '1 It could not determine whether he would become Ford-
incompetent if he stopped taking the medication. 12  However, "Sin-
gleton does not argue that under medication he is unaware of his
punishment and why he is to be punished.' 29 In 1997, during the
course of these appeals, "Singleton was placed under a Harper invol-
untary medication order" that was not renewed because Singleton
had been taking his medication voluntarily.
130
A sharply divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit began
by reviewing Ford, Harper, Riggins, and the Eighth Circuit's ruling in
Sell'3 ' The court cited Moran v. Burbine32 for the proposition that
"the government has an essential interest in carrying out a lawfully
imposed sentence.' 33 The court found that, as "Singleton prefers to
take the medication rather than be in an unmedicated and psychotic
state" and that "[he] suffered no substantial side effects . . .. the
State's interest in carrying out its lawfully imposed sentence is ... su-
,21 Id. at 1021. While not enumerated in the court's majority opinion, some manifestations
of Singleton's illness were that "he believed his prison cell was possessed by demons and that
the authorities had planted a device in his ear. He insisted that his victim, whom he had known
at the time of the murder, was still alive." Lewis, supra note 120.
124 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1021.
125 Id.
126 Id.
12 Id. at 1022.
128 Id.
" Id. See also id. at 1025 ("Singleton has never argued, and in fact has agreed repeatedly,
that he is competent while he is medicated").
" Id.
"' United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002). This ruling was later vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
..2 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (discussing "society's compelling interest in finding, convicting,
and punishing those who violate the law").
,' Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025.
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perior" to Singleton's interest in being free from unwanted13 4 medica-
tion.3 5 After finding that there were "no less intrusive means of en-
suring... competence short of antipsychotic medication," the court
reached "the core of the dispute: whether the antipsychotic medica-
tion is medically appropriate for Singleton's treatment.
''
3
6
Singleton argued that the medication was obviously not in his "ul-
timate best medical interest" where the result was competency for
execution.3 7 Singleton, according to the court, presented a choice
between "medication followed by execution and no medication fol-
lowed by psychosis and imprisonment. 3 3 As neither of these was par-
ticularly desirable to him, Singleton offered the court a third option:
"a stay of execution until involuntary medication is no longer needed
to maintain his competence.' '3 9 The court rejected this focus on
long-term medical interest, finding that "Singleton implicitly con-
cedes that the medication is in his short-term medical interest.'
40
The court held that the only unwanted consequence of medication
was competency for execution. Since Singleton's due process interest
in life had been "foreclosed by the lawfully imposed sentence of exe-
cution and the Harper procedure," the court concluded that his best
medical interest must be determined "without regard to whether
there is a pending date of execution.""' As such, the court held that
a "mandatory medication regime, valid under the pendency of a stay
of execution, does not become unconstitutional under Harper when
an execution date is set."'43
Furthermore, the court found that such an execution would not
violate Ford, as Singleton would be aware of his punishment and why
he was to receive it. The Court held that "[a] State does not violate
the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Ford when it executes a
prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on death row
but who subsequently regained competency through appropriate
' The court described the medication as "unwanted" only in the shadow of an impending
execution; if the execution date were stayed, the court found that Singleton would prefer to
take his medication. The court also cited a psychiatrist's notes of his interview with Singleton:
"I advised him to consider changing the medication to pill form. Mr. Singleton indicated that
he could not do this. His exact words were as follows, 'I don't want it to seem like I'm running
a game, but I have a case going involving forced medication.'" Id. at 1025 n.3 (quoting Dr. Ken-
neth D. Wright).
1 I3 d. at 1025.
1 Id.
Id. at 1026.
I ld.
1,9 Id.
14 Id.
141 Id.
14" Id.
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medical care.'0 4' The court affirmed the district court's denial of ha-
beas corpus.144
The dissent, by Judge Haney and joined by three others, found
that the execution of "a man who is severely deranged without treat-
ment, and arguably incompetent when treated, is the pinnacle of
what Justice Marshall called 'the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance." 45 The dissent discussed a number of Singleton's mental
abnormalities and symptoms, such as his belief that he was God but
could nevertheless be executed because of his physical body. 46 The
dissent differentiated between Singleton's drug treatment and an ac-
tual cure, as the drugs "merely calm and mask the psychotic symp-
toms which usually return to debilitate the patient when the medica-
tion is discontinued.'4 4 As Singleton would never be cured by these
drugs, the dissent argued that "Ford's prohibition on executing the
insane should apply with no less force to Singleton than to untreated
prisoners." 14s Further, the dissent would hold that "[o] nce an execu-
tion date was set .. .justification for medicating Singleton under
Harper evaporated.', 49 Finally, mentioning the Hippocratic Oath, the
AMA and APA ethical standards, and the Suvreme Court's reliance
on medical ethics in Washington v. Glucksberg,"' the dissent noted that
the majority holding will "inevitably result in forcing the medical
community to practice in a manner contrary to its ethical stan-
dards."15' Thus, according to the dissent, the state should medicate
Singleton for his best medical interest, but it cannot execute him.
The dissent believed "that the appropriate remedy is for the district
court to enter a permanent stay of execution.
" 
15
' Id. at 1027.
14 Id. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in October 2003, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003),
Charles Singleton was put to death by lethal injection on January 6, 2004. See Brian Cabell, Ar-
kansas Executes Mentally 1ll Inmate (Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/06/
arkansas.executions/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
145 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1030 (Haney, J., dissenting) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 410 (1986)).
41 Id. at 1032 (Haney,J., dissenting).
... Id. at 1033 (Haney, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 759 (La.
1992)); see also Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 98; Nancy S. Horton, Comment, Restoration of
Competency for Execution: Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur, 44 SW. L.J. 1191, 1204 (1990) ("Despite
their beneficial effects, antipsychotic drugs merely mask the debilitating symptoms of major
mental disorders; the drugs do not cure the mental disorder.")
148 Id. at 1034 (Haney,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1036 (Haney,J., dissenting).
'0 521 U.S. 702, 705-07 (1997) (upholding Washington State's prohibition against assisted
suicide).
' Id. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1036 (Haney, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 1037 (Haney,J., dissenting).
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IV. A PROPOSAL IN SUPPORT OF SINGLETON V. NORRIS
There is no persuasive reason why a state should not be permitted
to involuntarily medicate an incompetent inmate for the purpose of
restoring his competency for execution. The state has a compelling
interest in punishing those who violate the law; such an execution
furthers that interest within the bounds of the law. None of the ra-
tionales put forth by Ford to justify the prohibition on the execution
of the insane are applicable to medically competent inmates. More-
over, forcible medication comports with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Sell, as such medication is in the inmate's best medical interest
in light of his medical condition. Finally, as a practical matter, such
executions are the only reasonable option for states facing inmates
like Charles Singleton, both to further penological interests and
avoid potential malingering. Involuntary medication of inmates to
restore their competency for execution should remain available to
the states.
A. The Rationales of Ford Are Inapplicable to Drug-Induced Competency for
Execution
As the Supreme Court found in Ford v. Wainwright, the common
law bar against the execution of the insane "bears impressive histori-
cal credentials." 153 The Court noted that Blackstone called the prac-
tice "savage and inhuman" in 1769,'5' and Coke referred to it as "a
miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of extream [sic] inhuman-
ity and cruelty" in 1680.155 In holding the execution of the insane vio-
lative of the Eighth Amendment, the Court could not find an over-
arching reason for the rule at common law; the Court instead listed
many reasons for the prohibition. These divergent rationales, how-
ever, cease to apply in the context of involuntarily medicated inmates
who have been restored to competency for execution, and Ford does
not bar their execution.
15' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
" Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *24-25). Blackstone also wrote:
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under
these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a man in his sound memory
commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not
to be arraigned for it: because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution
that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be
tried: for how can he make his defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses
his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment,
he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the
humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have al-
leged something in stay ofjudgment or execution.
Id. (quoting Blackstone, supra note 1, at *24-25).
155 Id. (quoting Coke, supra note 35, at 6).
[Vol. 7:1.-
NO REASON FOR EXEMPTION
1. Execution of the Insane Does Not Serve the Two Principal Social Purposes
of the Death Penalty
The death penalty has traditionally been justified on two grounds:
"retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offend-
ers."'156  Like the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins,
"[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty on [a forcibly medi-
cated inmate] 'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals,
it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment."
7
While the execution of an insane inmate does not contribute to these
goals, that is not the case for the execution of a competent but medi-
cated inmate: such an execution does serve the deterrence and ret-
ribution goals of capital punishment.
A. Deterrence
Deterrence has been defined as "the interest in preventing capital
crimes by prospective offenders." 58 The deterrent value of executing
the insane has been in doubt since the time of Coke: "it provides no
example to others and thus contributes nothing to whatever deter-
rence value is intended to be served by capital punishment.' 5 9 It has
been argued that "the refusal to execute incompetent prisoners...
does not send a counterproductive message to potential offenders,
since no potential offender commits a capital offense on the theory
that he might subsequently become incompetent and thereby have
his life spared from execution.
"
0
6
0
One famous response to that argument is that "if the purpose [of
capital punishment] is to serve as an example to others, the demon-
stration that not even supervening insanity will halt the execution of
one who commits a capital crime will... make the in terrorem effect so
much the stronger."' 6' Even more importantly, however, such an ar-
' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion); accord Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (quoting Gregg).
157 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal
quotations omitted).
"' Id. See also David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row-IsJudicial Inter-
vention Warranted?, 4 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 707, 709 (1991) (defining deterrence as "the act or
process of discouraging others from acting in a similar fashion.").
"' Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing COKE, supra note 35, at 6).
IS Byers, supra note 11, at 374; see also Matthew S. Collins, Note, Involuntarily Medicating Con-
demned Incompetents for the Purpose of Rendering Them Sane and Thereby Subject to Execution, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1229, 1237-38 (1992) (describing the deterrence rationale in the involuntary medica-
tion context).
"' Byers, supra note 11, at 374 (quoting Henry Weihofen, A Question ofJustice: Trial orExecu-
tion of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A.J. 651, 652 (1951)); see also Ward, supra note 16, at 51-52.
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gument looks at deterrence from too narrow a perspective. The de-
terrent effect in the execution of an inmate who subsequently be-
came incompetent (and was involuntarily administered competency-
restoring drugs) is not directed solely towards other potential offend-
ers who expect to subsequently become incompetent. The deterrent
effect is equally applicable to any potential offender: commit a capi-
tal crime, and you will be executed. Just as the execution of a dia-
betic inmate would deter the diabetic and non-diabetic alike, so too
does the execution of an inmate who has been medicated to restore
competency deter all potential capital criminals. A scheme of deter-
rence premised on the above argument (i.e., the execution of those
who subsequently became incompetent deters only those who predict
that they may also become subsequently incompetent) would fail to
reach a significant percentage of potential offenders, eliminating the
effectiveness of deterrence. Whatever deterrent value capital pun-
ishment has on prospective criminals, 62 the execution of an inmate
who has been forcibly medicated to restore his competency has the
same (or greater) aggregate deterrent effect as any other execution.
B. Retribution
The Supreme Court has defined retribution as "the interest in see-
ing that the offender gets his 'just deserts ' 63 and as "the need to off-
set a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral quality.""'
The Court in Ford found that retribution is not served by the execu-
tion of the insane because "execution of an insane person.., has a
'lesser value' than that of the crime for which he is to be punished."'C
Therefore, as "each wrong must be offset by a punitive act of the
same quality," and as "killing an insane person does not have the
162 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court analyzed the statistical studies of the
deterrent effect of capital punishment, finding
[s]tatistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to
crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. The results simply
have been inconclusive.
[Thus, t]he value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual
issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures ....
Id. at 184-86 (plurality opinion); see also Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale,
Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L.
REv. 995, 1002-03 (1991) ("If the death penalty deters at all, then it will do so more effectively
without the exception for those who are incompetent to face execution.").
'6' Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); accord BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (7th ed.
1999) (defining retribution as "punishment imposed as a repayment or revenge for the offense
committed" and "something justly deserved.").
' Ford, 477 U.S. at 408; see also Katz, supra note 158, at 709 ("[R]etribution commonly is de-
fined as restoring a previously existing equilibrium to what it had been before the offensive be-
havior had been committed.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
' Id. (quoting Hazard & Louisell, supra note 37, at 387).
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same moral quality as killing a sane one," the retributive goal of capi-
tal punishment is not served by executing the insane.'66
With respect to the execution of an insane offender, this argu-
ment has been criticized on practical grounds:
If the punishment must qualitatively and quantitatively match the crime,
then this theory becomes impossible to apply because the official per-
forming the punishment lacks any method for comparing incommensu-
rate evils. Does the principle require, for example, that the state torture
torturers?... This theory would preclude punishment of those who
committed crimes for which no comparable punishment was possible.
How, for example, could the state punish the vandal who destroys a work
of art but has never created one that could be destroyed in return?
Would incarceration never be ajustified punishment except for crimes of• . !67
false imprisonment?
In addition to these practical criticisms, even more important is that
the retributive goals of capital punishment are served by the execu-
tion of one who is medically competent, insofar as it has the same
moral quality as any other execution. If the inmate was competent at
the time of the crime and is competent (due to medication) at the
time of execution, the execution achieves the goal of "balancing the
moral scales."' 68 The inmate knew the nature of the crime when he
committed it, and he knows the punishment that is about to be im-
posed upon him; from a cognitive perspective he is no different than
any other capital inmate. His competence, therefore, renders his
execution of equal value, satisfying the retributive goal of "off-
set[ting] a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral qual-
ity."" 66 As such, because the retributive goals of capital punishment
are achieved through these executions, the state should not be de-
prived of this course of action.
Retribution has also been described as "the satisfaction of the so-
ciety's thirst for vengeance. That thirst" is adequately quenched
by the execution of an inmate who has been forcibly medicated to re-
store his competence. Such an inmate's culpability at the time of the
crime cannot be doubted (as he was properly held responsible for his
actions and convicted), and his execution should comport with "the
'( Hazard & Louisell, supra note 37, at 386-87; see also Schopp, supra note 162, at 1005
("[E]xecuting insane offenders will not restore the moral balance because the harm or suffer-
ing produced in the severely disturbed offender will not be comparable to that which the of-
fender caused in the presumably [sane] victim.").
167 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1006.
Id. at 1005.
,' Ford, 477 U.S. at 408.
'70 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1006.
,' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The instinct for retribu-
tion is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law.").
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community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the pen-
alty of death."'72
Finally, retribution also serves the goal of "proportionate punish-
ment, . . . requir[ing] punishment in relative proportion to the of-
fender's guilt."73  This backward-looking retributivism ignores the
current mental state of the offender. Assuming that the inmate
committed a capital crime and the sentence was lawfully imposed,
"psychopathology at the time of execution [would] not alter the de-
gree of guilt attributed to the actions performed while sane."74 If this
goal of retribution is taken to its logical extreme, then not only may
the state execute an inmate who has been medically-restored to com-
petency, it may in fact execute an unquestionably insane inmate, in
direct contravention of Ford v. Wainwright.175 Under this view, the
execution of a medically competent inmate would satisfy the retribu-
tive goals of the death penalty as well.
As Justice Powell wrote, "one of the death penalty's critical justifi-
cations, its retributive force, depends on the defendant's awareness of
the penalty's existence and purpose."' 176 That justification is satisfied
when the death penalty is imposed upon those that have been medi-
cally restored to competency. The execution of these inmates "meas-
urably contributes" to the retributivism of capital punishment in the
same degree as the execution of a sane inmate. Retribution offers no
reason to exempt those who have been medically restored to compe-
tence from execution.
2. Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur
Another reason posited by Ford for the prohibition on executing
the insane is that "execution serves no purpose in these cases because
madness is its own punishment: furiosus solo furore punitur.' 77 This
argument fails for a number of reasons. First, if madness itself were
sufficient punishment, "incompetent offenders would have their sen-
tences commuted and would be released upon recovering their men-
tal capabilities."'' 78 Second, "severe mental disorder does not neces-
sarily entail extreme distress," and thus is not coextensive with
112 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (plurality opinion).
173 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1008 ("[M]urder must be punished more severely than assault,
intentional homicide more severely than negligent homicide, and unprovoked assault more
severely than provoked assault.").
174 Id.
171 See supra Part I.B.
'76 Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell,J., concurring).
177 Id. at 407 (quoting Blackstone, supra note 1, at *395).
'78 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1002.
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punishment.17' Third, madness is not its own punishment "simply be-
cause it is not punishment at all.'" " Mental disorder is not imposed
by an authority on an offender for commission of an offense, and,
"[a] fortiori, a condition that does not constitute punishment cannot
constitute punishment comparable to death.' ' 1 2  Finally, and most
significantly, even if madness itself were a punishment comparable to
death, inmates who can be restored to competency through antipsy-
chotic drugs can also escape their punishment (i.e., madness) by vol-
untarily taking these drugs. In this sense, the madness referred to by
Blackstone is quite different than madness today if symptoms can be
alleviated by antipsychotic drugs. 3 For inmates whose competency
can be restored by medication, madness cannot be its own punish-
ment.
3. Religious and Spiritual Reasons
Ford also justifies its holding on religious underpinnings: "it is un-
charitable to dispatch an offender 'into another world, when he is
not of a capacity to fit himself for it.""'8 s4 Justice Powell espoused a
similar reason, writing that "only if the defendant is aware that his
death is approaching can he prepare himself for his passing.'9
8 5
This justification for banning the execution of the insane has
been attacked on First Amendment grounds.5 6 It has been said that
"[t] his rationale is difficult to reconcile with the principle of neutral-
ity toward religion that the First Amendment of the Constitution is
usually understood to mandate.'8 7  Such a rationale, the argument
goes, "elevates one particular religious tradition to a privileged
status."'188
1 T Id.
'8 Id.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (describing punishment as reprimanding a wrong-
doer).
..2 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1002.
"' It is assumed that a defendant can alleviate his symptoms by taking drugs; otherwise that
defendant would be unable to be restored to competency and would fall outside the purview of
this Comment.
, ' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (quoting Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the
Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 How. St. Tr. 474, 477 (1685)); accord Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339
U.S. 9, 18 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is inconsistent with Religion, as being
against Christian Charity to send a great Offender quick, as it is stil'd, into another World, when
he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it.") (quoting Hawles, supra, at 477).
185 Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell,J., concurring).
IN "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
,17 Schopp, supra note 162, at 998.
IN Id. at 999. The argument that a defendant should be able to prepare himself for his pass-
ing has also been criticized on religious grounds, as it suggests that "humanity must exercise
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Regardless of the veracity of the argument that the condemned
inmate should be able to prepare for his passing, 89 the argument is
simply inapplicable to inmates whose competency can be restored
through the administration of antipsychotic drugs. If the inmate is
competent to be executed after taking drugs19 -that is, he is aware of
his punishment and why he is to suffer it'91-then he should un-
doubtedly be able to fit himself for death however he chooses.
Unlike Ford, for example, such an inmate would be "of a capacity to
fit himself' for his death. 92 In that sense, a forcibly medicated but
competent inmate is no different from any other capital inmate, and
the requirement that he be able to prepare for death is met.
4. Ability to Assist Counsel
Finally, the rule against executing the insane is justified on
grounds that a competent inmate "might have been able to make al-
legations which would stay judgment or execution," or aid counsel in
some fashion during the appeals process. 93 This argument theoreti-
cally assures that "convicted persons will not die only because they
lack the ability to raise exculpatory or mitigating arguments."1 94 Some
commentators have argued that this argument lacks veracity by dint
of the extensive state and federal appeals process, 195 during which
"the right to counsel.. . [will] assure effective review of death sen-
tences."'196 Further, it has been argued that "appeals that occur late in
the sequence of events leading to execution tend to address legal
rather than factual issues, emphasizing the competence of the attor-
mercy because God cannot be trusted to do so." Id. at 998-99; see also Byers, supra note 11, at
372 ("[C] ritics of this religious based rationale have questioned why society should suspend the
execution of an incompetent prisoner, since it symbolizes society granting mercy that "God
cannot be trusted to do.") (citations omitted). Finally, the argument has been critiqued from a
practical perspective. There is no reason for the "legal system [to] grant such special weight to
this particular set of the condemned person's values and preferences." Schopp, supra note 162,
at 999.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
It must be assumed that the drugs would render the inmate competent to be executed
under Ford; if that is not the case, then that inmate falls outside the purview of this Comment.
"' SeeFord v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,422 (1986) (Powell,J., concurring).
192 Id. at 407 (quoting Hawles, supra note 184, at 477).
" Ward, supra note 16, at 50. This justification has also been proffered by Blackstone, as
quoted by the Court in Ford. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
' Schopp, supra note 162, at 1000.
195 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the proliferation and lengthening of
capital appeals).
"" Schopp, supra note 162, at 1000; see also Ward, supra note 16, at 50 ("It is unlikely, how-
ever, that a defendant who recently became incompetent might suddenly remember something
that he would not have recalled earlier in the proceedings."); Hazard & Louisell, supra note 37,
at 383-84.
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ney rather than that of the condemned prisoner."' 97 While these ar-
guments are inconsistent with the wave of recent exonerations's and
death penalty moratoria,'9 their primary failing is that, vis-a-vis in-
mates who have been forcibly medicated to restore competency, they
simply do not apply. As these inmates are able to function compe-
tently through the use of antipsychotic drugs, they should be able to
help their attorneys to the same extent. as otherwise competent in-
mates The fear that executing an insane person will increase the risk
of executing the innocent is allayed when the condemned is made
competent through the use of antipsychotic drugs.
B. If not Forcible Medication, Then What?: Other Options
With increasing frequency, courts are being presented with an
inmate who, though competent at the time of the crime, trial, and
sentencing, has subsequently become insane. Antipsychotic drugs al-
leviate the symptoms to the point where the inmate is competent for
execution as well. The medication is taken voluntarily; he, in fact,
prefers his life with the drugs to his reversion to mental incompe-
tency without them. However, as execution day approaches, the in-
mate voluntarily ceases his medication regime, reverting to incompe-
tency and avoiding execution. As delineated in Singleton, courts in
this situation are faced with three alternatives-no medication fol-
lowed by psychosis and imprisonment, a stay of execution until medi-
cation is no longer needed to maintain competency, or involuntary
200medication followed by execution.
1. No Medication Followed by Psychosis and Imprisonment
If an inmate cannot be executed due to incompetence, but also
cannot be forcibly medicated to restore that competence, a court
could resort to "no medication followed by psychosis and imprison-
ment. '20' This would essentially consist of a standing threat to the
'9 Schopp, supra note 162, at 1000. But cf The Innocence Project, Case Profiles, available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display-cases.php?sort=year__exoneration (last visited
Sept. 14, 2004) listing the 140 people who were wrongly convicted and subsequently released
based on newfound DNA evidence between 1989 and 2004).
... See The Innocence Project, supra note 197 (listing thirty-seven people who were exoner-
ated in 2002 and 2003).
' See, e.g., Illinois Suspends Death Penalty (Jan. 31, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/
01/31/illinois.executions.02/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) ("Illinois Gov. George
Ryan ... imposed a moratorium on the state's death penalty."); Maryland's Governor Issues Death
Penalty Moratorium (May 14, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/05/09/maryland.
death.penalty/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
'w' Id.
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inmate: voluntarily take antipsychotic drugs that will alleviate your
mental disease, and you will be executed as soon as the drugs begin
to take effect and your competency is restored. This puts the inmate
to a Hobbesian choice: insanity (when there are drugs that can sig-
nificantly alleviate the affliction) or death. A court-imposed choice of
this nature is unimaginably horrible; it is "the pinnacle of what Justice
Marshall called 'the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.
' 2
0
2
This would patently violate "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. ,2 03 Putting this choice to a
capital inmate is simply not a permissible alternative.
2. Stay of Execution Until Involuntary Medication Is no Longer Needed to
Maintain Competence
Courts are also presented with the option, suggested by Charles
Singleton, of "a stay of execution until involuntary medication is no
longer needed to maintain competence., 20 4 This was the alternative
advocated by the Singleton dissent: "the appropriate remedy is... a
permanent stay of execution." 20 5 This approach certainly comports
with Ford and Sell (as there would be no need to involuntarily medi-
cate, except under a possible Harper justification). Further, it com-
ports with the "evolving standard of decency" on which the Eighth
Amendment is based. States are, of course, free to adopt this policy
when confronted with insane but medically competent inmates, 06 but
this would fail to further "society's compelling interest
in ... punishing those who violate the law."
20 7
3. Involuntary Medication Followed by Execution
A final option for states faced with an inmate who refuses to take
antipsychotic drugs that would restore his competency is "involuntary
medication followed by execution."2  While proscribed in Louisiana
and South Carolina, 209 this is the best option for states. Involuntary
medication avoids the practical problem of opportunistic inmates,
Id. at 1030 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410
(1986)).
' Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring the North Carolina death penalty statute unconstitu-
tional)).
' Id.
Id. at 1037 (Heaney,J., dissenting).
Louisiana and South Carolina have judicially adopted this approach. See supra Parts III.A-
B, respectively.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
" Id.
See supra Parts III.A-B, respectively.
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carries out a legally imposed sentence in furtherance of society's "es-
sential interest in carrying out a lawfully imposed sentence," 10 and
comports with the law of Ford and Sell.
a. Opportunistic Inmates
In Sell, Justice Scalia expressed a concern that the majority's hold-
ing would "allow criminal defendants in [Sell's] position to engage in
opportunistic behavior. They can, for example, voluntarily take their
medication until halfway through trial, then abruptly refuse and de-
mand an interlocutory appeal from the order that medication con-
tinue on a compulsory basis." ' A similar concern exists with respect
to medically competent inmates awaiting execution. If the State is
not permitted to involuntarily medicate for the purpose of execution,
an inmate would be able to voluntarily take his medication in the pe-
riod leading up to his execution, but cease taking it voluntarily as
execution draws near. In such a case, the inmate would virtually
force the state into adopting the second option above, i.e., granting a
permanent stay of execution. Permitting the state to involuntarily
medicate an inmate to restore his competency for execution nullifies
such opportunistic behavior.
This type of behavior is more than merely theoretical. Singleton
himself made no secret of his desire to take the antipsychotic medica-
tion.1 2 However, when faced with an impending date of execution,
he made repeated attempts "to avoid the penalty Arkansas has im-
posed on him. 2 1 3 In an interview with Singleton on March 27, 2000,
Dr. Kenneth Wright wrote:
I advised Mr. Singleton that he was taking the medication in shot form
that was a tranquilizer and frequently had a side effect of being sedating.
I advised him to consider changing the medication to pill form. Mr. Sin-
gleton indicated that he could not do this. His exact words were as fol-
lows, "I don't want it to seem like I'm running a game, but I have a case
going involving forced medication."
At this point, I interrupted Mr. Singleton and advised him that several
months ago I had elected not to return him to the Forced Medication
Review Panel because he appeared to be in remission from psychotic
symptoms and he had been taking his medication voluntarily. Mr. Sin-
gleton, at this point, became enraged, indicating that I did not have the
21 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025 (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 426).
.. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 191 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2,1 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025 n.3 ("Singleton stated several times that he desires to take the
antipsychotic medication.").
"13 Id.
Sept. 20041
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authority to change his medication from being forced.... Mr. Singleton
stormed out of the interview.21 4
While it is perfectly understandable that Singleton would use any
means necessary to delay his impending execution,215 permitting
forcible medication if the drugs will render an inmate competent will
eliminate Justice Scalia's concerns1 6 about opportunistic inmates in
the realm of execution (just as the Sell case has presumably done in
the trial realm).2 17
b. Ford and Sell: Best Medical Interest
The practice of forcibly medicating an inmate for the purposes of
restoring competence for execution is in accordance with the law of
Ford and Sell. • 218
Ford prohibits the execution of the insane; that is, according to
Justice Powell, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of
those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it. 2 19 In Singleton and similar cases, where
the inmate is competent while under medication, the requirements
of Ford, awareness and ability to relate punishment to crime, are met.
Further, as discussed above, the rationales proffered by the Ford
Court for exempting the insane from execution are inapplicable to
inmates whose competency can be restored through administration
of antipsychotic medication. Ford should serve no barrier to the
forcible medication and execution of Singleton and similarly situated
capital inmates.
Nor should Sell serve as a barrier to such involuntary medications
and executions. Sell requires that "administration of the drugs [be]
medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light
of his medical condition., 222 Singleton argued forcefully that "medi-
cation obviously is not in [his] ultimate best medical interest where
2 * Id. (citation omitted).
215 It is not only understandable for capital defendants to delay their executions by any
means necessary, it is in fact quite common, as evidenced by the proliferation of capital appeals
(both mandatory, optional and petitions for habeas corpus). See supra note 7 and accompanying
text (delineating the expanding appeals process for capital defendants).
216 SeeSell v. United States, 539 US 123, 191 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 211 and
accompanying text.
21 See Sell 539 U.S. at 169 (permitting forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs "in lim-
ited circumstances").
"18 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
2,9 Id. at 422 (Powell,J., concurring).
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Singleton has never argued,
and in fact has agreed repeatedly, that he is competent while he is medicated.").
22 See supra Part iV.A.
Sell 539 U.S. at 181 (emphasis in original).
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one effect of the medication is rendering [him] competent for exe-
cution. '223 This interpretation of "best medical interest," however, be-
lies the holding in Sell. The phrase "medical condition," by its plain
meaning, does not take into account effects on competency to be
executed (or to stand trial); it refers only to Singleton's diagnosable
mental illnesses, and there is no dispute that medication is in the best
interest of his mental illnesses.
It is clear that "Singleton [did] not dispute that the antipsychotic
medication [was] in his medical interest during the pendency of a
stay of execution. He has stated he takes it voluntarily because he
does not like the symptoms he experiences without it."' 4 According
to Sell, that should end the inquiry. "[A] n assertion that execution is
not in his medical interest" simply misinterprets the phrase "medical
interest" by expanding its meaning to cover a lawfully-imposed pun-
ishment that should not be relevant to "medical interest."2 2 5 As the
Eighth Circuit found, "the best medical interests of the prisoner must
be determined without regard to whether there is a pending date of
execution. 226  Such a holding comports with Sells command that
"best medical interest" be determined "in light of [the prisoner's]
medical condition. 227  Sell unquestionably permits the involuntary
medication of inmates for the purpose of restoring them to compe-
tence for execution.
CONCLUSION
There is simply no persuasive reason for proscribing the involun-
tary medication of insane capital inmates for the purpose of restoring
competency to be executed. It furthers the retributive and deterrent
goals of capital punishment while comporting with the law of Sell and
Ford. If the state chooses to engage in capital punishment, then its
goals are served by these executions as surely as they are by the exe-
cution of a sane inmate. Neither the Constitution, nor the law, nor
public policy prohibits a state from involuntarily medicating mentally
ill capital inmates if it would restore their competence for execution.
' Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026 (quotations omitted). While Singleton was decided without the
benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion of Sell, his contentions must be evaluated in light of the
most current law.
Id. ("The medication [is] effective in controlling Singleton's psychotic symptoms.").
Id. The Singleton court also found that "the due process interests in life and liberty that
Singleton assert[ed] have been foreclosed by the lawfully imposed sentence of execution." Id.
26 Id.
.. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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